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Normativity as a Kind of Conformity:




There seem to be things we ought not to believe and others
we are permitted to believe. Belief is treated as a normative
phenomenon both in everyday and academic discourse. At the
same time, normativity can be seen as a threat to a naturalistic
understanding of the world. Whilst naturalistic claims are of
descriptive nature, norms are prescriptive. It is usually held that
they cannot be reduced to statements of fact. This problem
is also pertinent to the normativity of belief. How is such a
phenomenon to be understood within a naturalist framework?
Sullivan-Bissett provides a naturalistic account of epistemic
normativity in which she explains epistemic normativity in
terms of biological functions of belief-producing mechanisms.
Importantly, her account is error-theoretic: She argues that we
mistake doxastic strategies, which are at best normative in a
hypothetical sense, to be categorical epistemic norms.
In continuation of Sullivan-Bissett’s account, I draw attention to
one of the belief-producing mechanisms which is responsible for
bringing about these mistaken beliefs. I claim that normative
conformity – a social-learning mechanisms – brings about our be-
liefs in the existence and categorical validity of epistemic norms.
Keeping with the evolutionary perspective employed by Sullivan-
Bissett, I answer questions about the function and phylogeny
of our mistaken beliefs in epistemic normativity by means of
normative conformity and in line with Sullivan-Bissett’s account.
Keywords: epistemic normativity, normativism, conformity,
proper function, naturalism
§1 Introduction
There seem to be things we ought not to believe and others we are per-
mitted to believe. We seem to quite often criticise and praise people for
the correct or incorrect beliefs they hold. Moreover, we often feel that
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they do something wrong when they form beliefs in an unreliable way.
Both in everyday and academic discourse, belief is treated as a norma-
tive phenomenon in this sense. Indeed, over the last couple of years,
epistemic normativity has established itself as a much-considered field
of philosophical inquiry. Most often, the norm which is said to govern
belief is one of truth, formulated in terms of permissibility [36]: One may
believe p if and only if it is true that p. This is associated with belief’s
standard of correctness, according to which a belief that p is correct iff
it is true that p. There are also other epistemic norms pertaining to ra-
tionality – a belief is correct iff it is rational; to knowledge – a belief that
p is correct iff it aims at knowledge; or to evidence – a belief is correct
iff it rests upon sufficient evidence [5]. At the same time, normativity
in general can be seen as a threat to a naturalistic understanding of the
world [7]. Whilst naturalistic claims are of descriptive nature, norms are
prescriptive. It is usually held that they cannot be reduced to statements
of fact. This problem is also pertinent to the normativity of belief. How
is such a phenomenon to be understood within a naturalist framework?
Sullivan-Bissett [22] provides a naturalistic account of epistemic nor-
mativity. She argues that our belief-producing mechanisms serve two
biological/proper functions. Next to producing true beliefs [PF1], they
also function to produce beliefs which are self-organising [PF2]. Such be-
liefs organise the individual in the sense that they, for example, maintain
self-esteem and avoid psychological damage. Importantly, this happens
irrespective of the truthfulness of those beliefs. So, beliefs produced by
PF2 can often be false.
According to Sullivan-Bissett, epistemic normativity is supposed to
consist of two claims:
I) Beliefs have truth as their standard of correctness.
II) There are categorical epistemic norms.
The aforementioned epistemic norms are categorical insofar as an agent
ought to follow them irrespective of her goals and desires. So, for exam-
ple, one ought to follow the epistemic norm pertaining to evidence – a
belief is correct iff it rests upon sufficient evidence – even if one does not
gain anything from following this norm in a practical sense.
Sullivan-Bissett takes PF1 to explain beliefs standard of correctness.
PF2 is supposed to explain our beliefs in the categorical validity of epis-
temic norms or what I will call the [normative pull]: The fact that we
believe that or feel as though there are categorical epistemic norms we
ought to follow. Sullivan-Bissett argues for an error-theoretic account
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according to which by believing in the categorical validity of epistemic
norms we make an adaptive mistake. PF2 functions to bring about the
disposition to have these mistaken beliefs – what I will call the [nor-
mative pull disposition]. The supposed categorical epistemic norms are
really just doxastic strategies to meet the first proper function of belief-
producing mechanisms, which is to produce true beliefs. Our mistaking
these strategies to be categorical epistemic norms brings us to follow
them more earnestly. Sullivan-Bissett concludes that neither belief’s
standard of correctness – understood in relation to PF1 – nor the sup-
posedly categorical epistemic norms – understood as doxastic strategies
to fulfil PF1 – give rise to the kind of normativity usually envisaged by
normativist philosophers of belief.
The goal of this paper is to shine a light on the mechanisms involved
in bringing about the normative pull disposition. In particular, I would
like to draw attention to a social-learning mechanism – namely normative
conformity – which, as I shall argue, is at least one of the mechanisms
involved in serving PF2. Normative conformity is implemented by an
expectation of others to conform, by an emotional urge to conform and
to punish deviant individuals. I will argue that this mechanism leads to
us conforming to the aforementioned doxastic strategies, gives rise to the
normative pull disposition and thus to our mistaken beliefs in epistemic
normativity. It is in this sense that I see the contribution of this paper
to be a development of Sullivan-Bissett’s account.1
To structure the forthcoming discussion, it will pay dividends to be
clear about what the concept of norm contains. Following Glock [7]
and von Wright [34], the term ‘norm’ can signify either the average
or usual level of attainment or the standard used to assess or judge
something, usually conduct. In the debate about epistemic normativity,
philosophers are interested in ‘norms’ of this second, prescriptive kind.
These norms are – as explicated above – usually taken to contain deontic
concepts. They are about what one ought (not) to believe. Norms of
this kind have a world to mind direction of fit and give agents at least
a pro tanto reason for following them. In Glock’s terminology, they are
context-specific in the sense that are often confined to certain subjects
(say, belief) and they are occasion-neutral in the sense that they apply
to an unlimited variety of cases (say, all beliefs). Importantly, there is a
difference between a norm and its linguistic expression: The same norm
can be spelled out in several different sentences or need not be expressed
at all – a norm can also govern implicitly. Closing this non-exhaustive
description of norms, normative facts – the existence of which Sullivan-
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Bissett denies for the case of belief – are features of reality which validate
norms.
I assume that in dealing with the normative pull disposition, we are
fundamentally concerned with a kind of doxastic behaviour. This means
that we are dealing with the formation, regulation, and maintenance
of beliefs in light of these strategies and supposed norms. Both the
doxastic strategies and our mistaking them to be categorical epistemic
norms facilitate the formation and regulation of beliefs in the most truth-
conducive way possible. Tinbergen’s [24] four questions which must be
answered to fully explain a behaviour should thus help to structure the
rest of this paper. Accordingly, at the very least the following questions
need answering to fully grasp the normative pull disposition:
Two questions relating to ultimate explanations:
1) What is the adaptive value of the normative pull disposition?
2) What is the phylogeny of the normative pull disposition?
And two questions relating to proximate explanations:
3) What is the causal role of the normative pull disposition?
4) What is the ontogeny of the normative pull disposition?
For the remainder of this paper, I shall maintain that all of these ques-
tions are to be addressed in relation to conformity-mechanisms. I will say
comparatively little about questions 3) and 4): It is not my goal to give
a complete causal story with regards to the normative pull disposition
or normative conformity’s involvement in bringing it about. Question
4) will remain unanswered. The causal and ontogenetic questions are
however not the only ones in need of answering. In keeping with the
perspective employed by Sullivan-Bissett, this paper takes the evolu-
tionary route and seeks to answer the ultimate questions as outlined
above. So, I will mainly address questions 1) and 2). By addressing
question 1) I hope to both get a clearer understanding of the function
conformity-mechanisms serve than is currently on offer in the relevant
empirical literature and to show that this function can be understood
in relation to PF2. This should go some way to understand the adap-
tive value of epistemic normativity. By addressing question 2) I hope
to make it plausible that conformity-mechanisms are in actuality one of
the mechanisms which fulfil PF2.
Before answering questions 1) and 2) I will in §2 first establish the
notion of biological function which both Sullivan-Bissett and I subscribe
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to. In §3 I will give a more detailed overview of Sullivan-Bissett’s account
and in §4 I will quickly introduce conformity-mechanisms as their un-
derstood in the relevant empirical literature. In §5 and §6 I will answer
questions 1) and 2) respectively.
§2 Biological functions
Since both Sullivan-Bissett and I use the notion of a biological function,
I would first like to introduce it before discussing her account.
I am advocating an etiological account of functions, according to
which – roughly – the function of a trait is what that trait (or traits of
the same type) was selected for in the past ([13], [16]). So, for example,
the function of the heart is to pump blood. This is so because, in past
instances where a creature’s heart was indeed pumping blood, this was
adaptive for the creature in question.
Importantly, this notion of functions comes with Normal explana-
tions/conditions: The conditions that must be mentioned in a mini-
mal explanation of how the function has successfully been performed
in the past. Furthermore, a function can be ascribed on the basis of
observed behaviour and without knowledge of the mechanism(s) which
bring about the behaviour. So, the ascription of a function to a trait
does not entail the ascription of a particular mechanism which fulfils this
function. ([14], [19]).2
With a clearer picture of functions in mind, I would now like to turn
to Sullivan-Bissett’s account of epistemic normativity.
§3 Sullivan-Bissett’s account
Sullivan-Bissett takes epistemic normativity to consist in the conjunction
of two claims:
I) Beliefs have truth as their standard of correctness.
II) There are sui-generis categorical epistemic norms.
With regards to I), ever since Williams [37] it is very much orthodox to
associate beliefs with truth and falsehood as a dimension of assessment.
It is in this sense that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p and
the belief that p is incorrect iff it is wrong that p.
With regards to II), the most discussed epistemic norm also pertains
to beliefs standard of correctness. There are, however, also other kinds
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of norms pertaining to rationality – a belief is correct iff it is rational;
to knowledge – a belief that p is correct iff it aims at knowledge; or
to evidence – a belief is correct iff it rests upon sufficient evidence [5].
In more recent research the epistemic norms are often formulated in
terms of permissibility: One may (with regards to the norm of truth)
believe p iff it is true that p [36]. These norms are thought to be sui -
generis because they only govern beliefs. Evaluating the correctness
of, for example, imaginings in terms of truth, evidence or knowledge is
generally inappropriate. Epistemic norms are thought to be categorical
insofar as agents ought to follow them irrespective of their goals and
desires. The practical benefits which might arise from following those
norms are irrelevant to our obligations towards them. These kinds of
norms stand in stark contrast to hypothetical norms which an agent only
“ought” to follow insofar as they help to fulfil her goals. So, for example,
it is thought that one ought to follow the epistemic norm pertaining to
evidence – a belief is correct iff it rests upon sufficient evidence – even if
one does not gain anything from following this norm in a practical sense.
Sullivan-Bissett seeks to naturalise both claims by means of biological
functions. To be more precise, she argues that our belief-producing
mechanisms serve two biological/proper functions. Next to producing
true beliefs [PF1], they also function to produce beliefs which are self-
organising [PF2].
Concerning PF1, it has often been argued that the claim, according
to which our beliefs aim at truth [37] is to be understood in the sense
that belief-producing mechanisms serve the proper function of producing
true beliefs ([15], [18]) and that having true beliefs is adaptive or advan-
tageous for the individual possessing them ([4, p. 49]; [5]). So, because
it is advantageous for individuals to have true beliefs, natural selection
has ‘installed’ mechanisms which function to produce such beliefs.
The beliefs produced by mechanisms responsible for PF2 facilitate
self-organisation in the sense that they, for example, maintain self-esteem
and avoid psychological damage. Sullivan-Bissett argues that the beliefs
produced by these mechanisms are not just malfunctioning instances of
mechanisms responsible for PF1. Though the beliefs they produce are
false, they are still adaptive and seemingly produced in a Normal matter.
The claim is that even if these mechanisms produce false beliefs, they
still do what they were selected for. Self-deceptive beliefs can serve as
an example: A failed footballer himself, a father is extremely proud of
his son’s extraordinary footballing abilities and is very much invested in
his potential career as a footballing professional. However, the beliefs in
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his son’s abilities are established and maintained in the face of a great
amount of evidence to the contrary. According to PF2, these beliefs
serve the self-organisation of the father. Would he believe the truth, it
would bring such enormous emotional disturbance to him that he would
be unable to function properly.3
Sullivan-Bissett claims that I) is to be explained in terms of PF1: The
only sense of correctness attached to belief is in relation to the first proper
function of belief-producing mechanisms. It is because they have it as
their proper function to produce true beliefs that such beliefs are correct
and false beliefs are incorrect. Belief’s standard of correctness is thus
a purely biological matter in the sense that it can be fully understood
in relation to the relevant mechanisms’ selection history. However, such
a biological kind of correctness as it pertains to the belief-producing
mechanisms does not give rise to normativity in any interesting sense.
Sullivan-Bissett follows Papineau ([17], [18]) in arguing that biological
functions can be reduced to claims about selection histories. The fact
that a trait was selected to do something does not entail that the effect
is in any sense valuable or that its performance has to be prescribed. So,
the sense of obligation or any kind of ought-element usually associated
with epistemic normativity is not to be found in beliefs standard of
correctness.
Sullivan-Bissett denies the existence of the categorical epistemic
norms which are invoked by II). Much rather, she argues for there be-
ing doxastic strategies which are mistaken to be categorical epistemic
norms. These strategies are in place to regulate the acquisition and
maintenance of beliefs in a truth-conducive way and thus help to facil-
itate the meeting of belief’s standard of correctness and the fulfilment
of PF1. Sullivan-Bissett defers to Leiter’s examples of such strategies –
they can be understood to contain something like the following: “treat
normal perceptual experience as prima facie veridical, honor logical in-
ferences, and employ the inductive method in empirical enquiry” [10, p.
75]. Importantly, such strategies are said to not contain any categorically
normative elements. It is my understanding of these strategies that the
individual following them need not be aware of their contents or even
of their existence. Though they can certainly be made explicit, they
can also merely be expressed in behaviour. Sullivan-Bissett maintains
that in mistaking these strategies to be sui-generis categorical epistemic
norms we make an adaptive mistake. This mistake is adaptive because
having these beliefs about epistemic normativity leads to a more robust
formation of true beliefs. Would we take these doxastic strategies to be
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just that – strategies without any categorical normative elements – we
would not have such a strong sense of obligation towards forming beliefs
in line with them. The resulting beliefs would be much less accurate.
The idea seems to be that because a subject believes that she really
ought to believe p iff she has sufficient evidence in favour of p, she will
more reliably have true beliefs (and thus more reliably fulfil PF1).
So, a central part of Sullivan-Bissett’s account is a metaethical import
of an error-theoretic kind. I would like to characterise the error we
commit by introducing the [normative pull]: The fact that we believe
that or feel as though there are categorical epistemic norms we ought to
follow. It is in this sense that the error we commit lies in our beliefs in
the existence and categorical validity of the supposed epistemic norms.
The disposition to commit this error – I shall call it the [normative pull
disposition] – is explained in evolutionary terms. Because the beliefs
subsumed under the normative pull are false but adaptive, Sullivan-
Bissett holds that the disposition to form such beliefs can be understood
as the outcome of mechanisms fulfilling PF2 – of mechanisms which
function to produce beliefs which are self-organising. The idea here
seems to be that because the normative pull leads to PF1 being more
reliably produced, it can be said that it organises the individual in an
adaptive way.
I would now like to turn to answering questions 1) and 2). Before
doing so, I shall first attempt to make the reader more familiar with the
notion of conformity at hand.
As a sort of rough overview of what follows, the big picture I would
like to argue for is that epistemic normativity is fundamentally about
doxastic behaviour. Doxastic behaviour, in turn, can be influenced by bi-
ological factors – e.g. we usually form beliefs based on what we perceive,
just because this is how we are set up to do things. But, importantly, it is
also influenced by social and cultural factors – e.g. we form beliefs based
on the inductive method because we have been taught to do so. Hence,
I take it that both biological and social factors are at play in bringing
about epistemic normativity. Following this, I maintain that epistemic
normativity is to be understood in relation to a biological mechanism
responsible for enabling social learning and cultural phenomena. This
mechanism is normative conformity. I claim that normative conformity
makes individuals conform to doxastic strategies. I furthermore hold
that the normative pull disposition and the ensuing doxastic behaviour
is caused either directly or indirectly by normative conformity. This is
to say that it is because our emotional urges to conform and punish de-
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viant individuals and our expectations of others to conform to norms are
so strongly pronounced that we mistake doxastic strategies to be more
than what they really are. On an intuitive level, it very much makes
sense to take these doxastic strategies to be categorical epistemic norms
when faced with such an emotional load: The supposed epistemic norms
being categorical would legitimise our wanting to conform to them and
punish individuals who do not follow them. It also seems justified to
expect other individuals to conform to these norms.
§4 What is conformity?
Conformity is a social-learning mechanism which is investigated in a
plethora of different empirical fields which on the one hand, have a dif-
ferent understanding of conformity itself and on the other hand have
different areas of analysis and explanatory interest with regards to the
phenomenon ([2], [30]). Since I import the notion of conformity from
empirical literature in order to apply it to a philosophical problem,
I shall now briefly present an understanding of conformity which is
shared within the aforementioned fields of enquiry. These remarks on
conformity-mechanisms should serve to make the later considerations on
their function and phylogeny more understandable.
“Conformity” describes the tendency of individuals to disproportion-
ately forego personal information about a behaviour in favour of the
majority’s variant of the behaviour [30]. Furthermore, a motivational
distinction for adopting the majorities variant has been established ([4],
[3]): In the case of informational conformity, individuals are motivated
to conform to the majority’s variant because of the search for accurate
information about the world. For normative conformity, individuals are
motivated by a concern for social information and interactions. Exam-
ples for the first kind of behaviour can be found in the realm of non-
human animals: Migrating male vervet monkeys, for example, conform
to the feeding habits of their new groups – even if these habits contra-
dict their previous behaviour ([30] & [35]). It is assumed they do so
because the feeding behaviour of their new group is better suited to the
local circumstances. The second kind of behaviour is not found in non-
human animals [1]. The following can serve as an example: A teenage
boy who takes up some behaviour of his peer-group – say choice of fash-
ionable clothes – not because of his actual agreement with the behaviour
in question but rather because he would like to fit in. As previously
mentioned, normative conformity is implemented by an emotional urge
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to conform to norms, the expectations of others to do so and the urge
to punish non-conforming individuals. So, importantly, the two forms
of conformity are distinguished by the presence of punishment and the
involvement of strong emotions in normative conformity. Conformity
in general is adaptive in information-poor circumstances where individ-
ual learning is costly because it allows for the aggregation of information
over the behaviour of many individuals. This is often described as letting
individuals tap into the wisdom of the crowd [6].
Of course, much more could be said about conformity- and related
social-learning mechanisms. Nevertheless, what has been said so far
should make it possible to meaningfully answer questions 1) and 2).
§5 Question 1) What is the adaptive value of the normative
pull disposition?
Question 1) asks about the adaptive value of a given trait. The adaptive
value of a trait can be specified in function-ascriptions. The ascription
of functions specifies what it is that a trait does which makes the trait
adaptive. For example, the adaptive value of the heart is expressed in
saying that its function is to pump blood.
I have claimed that conformity-mechanisms are at least in part re-
sponsible for bringing about the normative pull disposition and thus fulfil
PF2. In §4 I have presented an understanding of conformity-mechanisms
shared within the relevant empirical literature. Part of it referred to the
adaptive value of these mechanisms. If these conformity-mechanisms re-
ally bring about the normative pull disposition, it should be possible to
answer Question 1) based on this empirical understanding in much the
same way as Sullivan-Bissett does. To argue for this, I will first give
room to some clarificatory remarks about the function of conformity-
mechanisms as discussed in the empirical literature. After, I will seek to
establish that both Sullivan-Bissett and conformity-mechanisms answer
Question 1) along the same lines.
I noted previously (§4) that conformity-mechanisms are adaptive be-
cause they let individuals tap into the wisdom of the crowd - in the sense
that they allow for the aggregation of information over many individuals.
In this context, Van Leuween et al [30] argue that larger groups are better
suited to find adaptive answers to problems posed by their environment
because of the possibility of a synergy of the individuals’ cognitive ca-
pacities to discover and reason about the relevant contingencies. So, the
general idea seems to be that if there is little information available and
Basil Müller: Normativity as a Kind of Conformity 11
individual learning is costly, then it is often better to conform to the
behavioural – i.e. non-prescriptive – norm set by the majority. This is
so because they are more likely to contain some adaptive variants of the
relevant behaviours.
There seems to be a conceptual point to be made about conformity
with regards to its proper function:
1. Since conformity is a relation (one conforms to something), it seems
plausible to say that the adaptive value of conformity is always
relative to the adaptive value of what is being conformed to. If
one were to conform to non-adaptive behaviour, it seems clear
that conforming to that behaviour as such would in fact not be
adaptive. In this sense, however, conformity itself only comes with
a derived adaptive value from the thing individuals conform to –
and therefore without a proper adaptive value itself.
The notion of conformity just introduced seems to be a probabilistic
one – in the sense that conforming to the behaviour of the majority
heightens the chances of the individual to emulate useful behaviour. I
take it my point holds regardless: The degree to which conforming to
the majority’s behaviour is adaptive for the individual depends on the
degree of adaptiveness of the behaviour the individual conforms to.
2. The idea that conformity is adaptive because it “lets individuals
tap into the wisdom of the crowd“ in the light of 1. thus seems
to convey the point that conformity allows individuals to emu-
late adaptive behaviour. Amongst others, adaptive behaviour is
behaviour which fulfils a biological function.
So, considering these remarks, it can be said that the function of
conformity-mechanisms is to make individuals emulate adaptive be-
haviour. As discussed in §2, the notion of function at play is an eti-
ological one. This means that the function of conformity-mechanisms
is to make individuals emulate adaptive behaviour because when indi-
viduals were made to emulate adaptive behaviour in the past by these
mechanisms, this gave them an evolutionary advantage.
These remarks have however been of rather general nature – there are
lots of different kinds of adaptive behaviour individuals could conform
to. How is this supposed to work out for the epistemic case – i.e. in
relation to epistemic normativity and the normative pull disposition?
Remember, the picture I would like to advocate is the following:
normative conformity makes us conform to doxastic strategies and makes
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it so that we mistake these strategies to be categorical epistemic norms
– it brings about the normative pull disposition. This disposition is
adaptive because PF1 is more reliably fulfilled this way. The above
points 1. and 2. require the behaviour to which individuals conform to
possess some adaptive value. It seems clear that what makes conforming
worthwhile in the epistemic case is the adaptive value of PF1 being
more reliably fulfilled. So, the function of normative conformity for the
epistemic case is to make individuals conform to behaviour which leads
to PF1 being more reliably fulfilled. To be more precise, within this
picture two sorts of behaviour hold adaptive value for the same reason:
1st conforming to doxastic strategies as such is adaptive because PF1
is more reliably fulfilled this way and 2nd mistaking these strategies
to be categorical epistemic norms is adaptive because it leads to PF1
being even more reliably fulfilled. This will become important later on.
What remains to be shown is that Question 1) would be answered in the
same way by Sullivan-Bissett. Remember, she also describes PF2 rather
generally – as a function of mechanisms which produce false beliefs, and
which are organising the individual in some (adaptive) way. In the case
of epistemic normativity,4 she argues that the normative pull disposition
should be understood to be brought about by mechanisms fulfilling PF2.
This is so because the beliefs subsumed under the normative pull are false
but adaptive. They are adaptive because PF1 is more reliably fulfilled
in this way. The individual is thus organised in such a way as to more
reliably fulfil PF1.
It seems clear that in the epistemic case and for both the rather em-
pirical notion of the function of conformity-mechanisms and for PF2 the
ultimate adaptive value is the more reliable production of PF1. In this
sense it also seems to follow that both conformity-mechanisms and PF2
express the same function as far as epistemic normativity is concerned:
The function of the (conformity-) mechanisms at play in fulfilling PF2
is to more reliably produce PF1.
§6 Question 2) What is the phylogeny of the normative pull
disposition?
I claim that normative conformity is at least partially responsible for the
normative pull disposition. It follows that my account should be able
to answer question 2) in terms of normative conformity. I will try to do
so by showing how the evolutionary conditions which in the empirical
literature are said to give rise to normative conformity are also plausibly
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being met in many cases of doxastic behaviour.
I feel that it is prudent to focus on this not only because normative
conformity’s involvement in bringing about the normative pull disposi-
tion is just a contingent possibility. The distinction between informa-
tional and normative conformity also gives us ample reason to be inter-
ested in this. As introduced in §4, a motivational distinction between
informational and normative conformity is drawn in the empirical liter-
ature. For informational conformity, individuals conform to a behaviour
because of the search for accurate information about the world. For
normative conformity, individuals conform to a behaviour because of a
concern for social information and interactions. Only the latter is imple-
mented by emotional urges to conform and punish deviant individuals
and expectations of others to conform. I have argued that it is norma-
tive conformity which is involved in bringing about the normative pull
disposition. However, since Sullivan-Bissett argues that the normative
pull disposition ultimately serves to more reliably fulfil PF1 and since
PF1 just is to produce true beliefs, it seems more intuitive to assume
that informational conformity is involved in the normative pull disposi-
tion. This is so because just like PF1, informational conformity is also
concerned with gaining accurate information about the world. So, where
does the social aspect contained in normative conformity come in? The
aims of this paragraph are thus, on the one hand, to show that based
on the phylogeny of normative conformity, it is plausibly also at play in
bringing about the normative pull disposition and on the other hand to
highlight the social aspect contained in the normative pull disposition.
In general, I take it to be plausible that individuals conformed to
doxastic strategies for purely informational reasons. As mentioned in
§5 conforming to doxastic strategies as such is likely adaptive because
implementing these strategies will lead to PF1 being more reliably ful-
filled. However, in explaining the normative pull disposition and the
ensuing behaviour, normative conformity comes into the picture. I will
try to argue that it is evolutionary meaningful for normative conformity-
mechanisms to be implemented in the production of the normative pull
disposition because of the importance of accurate doxastic states for in-
terdependent social groups. In other words, it is because the truth or
falsity of individuals’ beliefs has great consequences for their respective
social groups, that the normative pull disposition and the ensuing epis-
temic behaviour is elicited by normative conformity. I will show this by
1st introducing the evolutionary origins and environmental conditions
which gave rise to normative conformity and 2nd arguing that these
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conditions if reasonably understood, are also present in many cases of
doxastic behaviour.
As far as evolutionary origins are concerned, VanSchaik and Burkart
et al ([1], [33]) argue that normativity first came about within the evo-
lution of another normative phenomenon, namely morality. Morality is
said to have emerged in hunter-gatherer societies some two million years
ago. It functions to allow for their interdependent lifestyle which is based
on direct and indirect reciprocity.5 Within this set-up, the reputation
of an individual is an important factor. This is so because cooperation
will only occur with individuals who achieve a certain threshold of repu-
tation. VanSchaik and Burkart argue that morality’s function is mainly
implemented by strong emotions which lead to prosocial behavioural
preferences and thereby allow for coordinated and synchronised actions
– i.e. cooperation.
Since there are however advantages to breaking norms, especially in
high pay-off and low-cost scenarios, not behaving according to norms
could be adaptive in many scenarios. In humans, a tendency to do
so is in part facilitated by the selfish dispositions of our psychology.
Importantly, ‘norm’ is still used in the descriptive sense of an average
level of attainment of conduct – for the case of “moral” behaviour this
could, for example, mean prosocial and collaborative types of behaviour.
VanSchaik and Burkart argue that normative conformity comes into the
picture when two conditions are met:
a) Interdependence within a group – in the sense that individuals need
other individuals to behave in a certain way in order to survive and
mate.
b) Conflict of interests of some sort – there is an incentive to cheat or
free-ride the efforts of others.
The already mentioned emotions and expectations subsumed under ‘nor-
mative conformity’ are seen to be responsible for the adherence to the
norm. It is only with normative conformity in play that ‘norms’ are not
just descriptive, but prescriptive. The authors assume that normative
conformity arose through the combination of informational conformity
– which they argue has been adaptive long before hominids roamed the
earth and is proven to exist in other species – with the relevant prosocial
emotions and the concern for one’s reputation.
Kappeler et al [9] mention a third condition: They argue that the
expectation of others to conform is linked to predictability. The pre-
dictability of (inter-)actions is an important factor for establishing one’s
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reputation as a viable and reliable partner in dyadic cooperation. Since
individuals who conform to the majority’s norm are quite predictable,
they thus gain an advantage. This might be a positive factor in bringing
about normative conformity. Thus, the third condition reads:
c) Predictability is an important factor of interactions.
As discussed in §4, conformity-mechanisms are adaptive in information-
ally poor circumstances, where individual learning is costly. This would
be a fourth condition:
d) Individual learning is costly.
So, importantly, normative conformity is adaptive when four conditions
are met, namely those of interdependence, of a conflict of interest, of the
relevance of predictability and when individual learning is costly. The
general point seems to be that normative conformity ensures that norms
important for a social group are adhered to even in light of competing
interests.
For the remainder of this paper, I would like to argue that doxastic
behaviour can meaningfully be said to meet the evolutionary conditions
in the context of which normative conformity is at play. This should help
to showcase the social importance of beliefs’ accuracy and to convince
the reader that normative conformity is indeed at play in bringing about
the normative pull disposition.
Before doing so I would like to note that I take VanSchaik and
Burkart’s conception of condition b) to be too strong. They argue that
an incentive to cheat must be present for individuals to deviate. How-
ever, natural selection does not care for which reasons individuals deviate
from (adaptive) behavioural norms. It only cares that they do so. In
this sense, it seems that what really needs to be present as a second
condition is the frequency of the deviation from adaptive behaviour. If
individuals deviate too frequently, then normative conformity is needed.
I take it to be true that this frequency will generally increase if there is
an incentive to deviate. However, there could also be other reasons for
this to happen. It could, for example, just be very difficult to find the
appropriate behavioural variant or individuals could just have the dispo-
sition to favour another, slightly less or even non-adaptive, behavioural
variant.
Furthermore, it also seems plausible that the two conditions – inter-
dependence and the conflict of interest – are linked in the sense that if
there happens to be a higher degree of interdependence, a smaller de-
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gree of conflict of interest will be sufficient to make normative conformity
worthwhile.
To properly assess normative conformity’s involvement in bringing
about the normative pull disposition, I would like to first draw attention
to the broader evolutionary context from which epistemic normativity
originated. Remember, VanSchaik, Burkart and Kappeler argued that
normative conformity was a factor in the evolution of morality which
came about in hunter-gatherer societies two million years ago. As far
as epistemic normativity and the normative pull disposition goes, I have
mentioned that it is plausible that individuals first conformed to doxastic
strategies for purely informational reasons. This later changed to norma-
tive conformity because of the social importance of beliefs. I do not feel
comfortable to pinpoint when such a change could have occurred. In-
stead, what I shall try to do is show that within an evolutionary context
envisaged by a well-established area of research – namely cumulative cul-
tural evolution – the four conditions can be met meaningfully. I will thus
claim that the normative pull disposition could have been established in
an evolutionary context as envisaged in cumulative cultural evolution,
without making any concrete claims as to the time/place this took place.
So, what is cumulative cultural evolution?6 Roughly, it describes
the process through which social learning builds a body of culturally
transmitted information in a population. Importantly, the information
is passed on not by genetics, but by culture and social learning. This
happens in such a way that locally adaptive aspects aggregate over time
– culture is cumulative in this sense. Adaptive practices, techniques,
and bodies of knowledge are built which no individual could figure out
by themselves in their lifetime. Interestingly, culture so understood can
be found in a variety of species – such as birds, bees, fish and many
primates. However, humans are by far the most effective social learners
and display the most complex cultural behaviour. Human culture is by
far the most cumulative, it is even sometimes argued that only human
culture is truly cumulative (though see [20] & [12] for discussion). Con-
formity is understood to be one of the key social-learning mechanisms
responsible for bringing about culture. The general point I would like to
make is that in becoming more important and saturating various parts
of our lives, culture and the processes and mechanisms underlying it
make it so that normative conformity also plays a part in the doxastic
and epistemic realm. In other words, because the way we form and reg-
ulate our beliefs is in part an important cultural technique which has
to be learned and refined socially, normative conformity is involved.7
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Most animals capable of forming beliefs will do so based on basic in-
nate mechanisms. But when it is important to do so accurately and
in complex circumstances, social-learning is involved. Leiter’s doxastic
strategies can again serve as an example: Whilst most animals will treat
perceptual experience as veridical just because their perceptual systems
are set-up to do just that, employing the inductive method in empiri-
cal enquiry is in many contexts something which has to be learned and
refined socially. It is because it is so important for a social group that
its members have accurate beliefs, that normative conformity conforms
individuals to these doxastic strategies and leads individuals to mistake
them for categorical epistemic norms. The evolutionary context I as-
sume is thus marked to a relevant degree by the processes described by
cumulative cultural evolution. This is to say that there is an accumula-
tion of cultural techniques, practices, and knowledge, including ways of
forming beliefs, which could not have been figured out by an individual
in their lifetime and which are learned socially.
I would now like to argue that in the evolutionary context just estab-
lished, many cases of doxastic behaviour can be said to meet the condi-
tions for normative conformity. Summarising what has been established
up to this point, normative conformity is relevant 1st in information-
poor circumstances, when individual learning is costly, 2nd when there
is interdependence, 3rd when a conflict of interest and, 4th, when the
relevance of predictability is given.
It seems quite clear that with regards to the first point, individ-
ual learning is quasi by definition of cumulative cultural evolution very
costly. This in the sense that individual learning is just not one of the
mechanisms involved. One of the slogans of the field is that cultural
practices, techniques, and bodies of knowledge cannot be learned by one
individual in their lifetime. They have to be learned socially and not
individually.
For 2nd, it seems fair to say that if in the previously described hunter-
gatherer societies there was a high degree of interdependence with re-
gards to behaviour, such that there had to be prescriptive norms facili-
tating the coexistence of individuals, then there was also a need for indi-
viduals to have accurate beliefs about the world and, in turn, for those
beliefs to be formed reliably. Individuals cannot participate in various
forms of collective action (e.g. collective hunting) if they do not have
accurate beliefs about the core elements of the relevant kinds of action.
Furthermore, it is not just that individuals cannot participate in various
kinds of behaviour, it is also the case that when they are participating in
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cooperative behaviour, other individuals rely on them to have accurate
beliefs for the behaviour to be successful. This reliance is amplified with
regards to single individuals not being able to learn techniques, prac-
tices, and bodies of knowledge in their lifetime. This will invariably lead
to a division of labour and specialisation with regards to these practices
and knowledge. This in the sense that for certain endeavours, a social
group will rely on the specialised beliefs of one individual to be accurate
for the task to work out as planned. Knowledge of different roles within
collective hunting can serve as a very low-lying example thereof, whilst
a more demanding example, which is also more steeped in philosophi-
cal history, could be the dependence on goldsmiths or chemists to say
whether something was really gold or not. The dependence on these
individuals to have accurate beliefs then heightens the need for those
beliefs to be formed reliably.
As far as the fourth point about predictability is concerned: Within
the philosophy of action, it is often assumed that beliefs – in compo-
sition with desires – play an important role for the performance of an
action. It thus seems quite plausible that having false beliefs leads to
an unsuccessful performance of the desired action and thus to unpre-
dictable behaviour. Since predictability of behaviour was already a rele-
vant condition in bringing about normative conformity in the evolution
of morality and since false beliefs will lead to unpredictable behaviour, it
seems that individuals forming their beliefs reliably would also already
have been an important factor when normative conformity was first es-
tablished.
I take conditions 1, 2 and 4 to be fairly intuitive. The third condi-
tion, regarding conflict of interests, is less straight-forward. Remember,
VanSchaik and Burkart argued for a strong wording of this condition:
[CoIStrong]: There is an incentive to cheat or free-ride on the efforts
of others.
Whereas I argued for a weaker form:
[CoIWeak]: Individuals deviate from the adaptive behavioural norm
(too) frequently.
As far as CoIStrong goes, it seems intuitive to think that an incentive to
somehow “cheat” the doxastic strategies or at least to not employ them
is not present. Individuals in general just seem better off when they have
true beliefs. However, underlying such an intuition is a picture of beliefs
in which they solely aim at truth. Within Sullivan-Bissett’s account,
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beliefs also fulfil another function: Namely to organise the individual.
This can also mean that an individual – by believing falsely – is pro-
tected from an unwelcome truth. In such cases, biologically speaking,
the individual is better off by believing falsely. “Pleasant” beliefs in this
sense can serve as an incentive to not employ doxastic strategies. This is
also reflected within the ethics of belief debate: It is often discussed (for
example, see [21]) that humans in their belief-formation can be influ-
enced by epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. Self-deception can serve
as an example: in cases of (regular) self-deceptive beliefs, there is an in-
centive to not follow prudent doxastic behaviour, i.e. to protect oneself
from unwelcome truths. Here, beliefs are (most likely indirectly) formed
for non-epistemic, rather than epistemic reasons. In this sense it seems
there is an analogue to cheating moral norms in the doxastic realm: one
disregards prudent doxastic behaviour in order to deceive and protect
oneself. It is in this sense that one finds oneself in a conflict of interest
between one’s epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. I do concede that
these points are somewhat speculative. Luckily, I already argued against
CoIStrong on independent grounds.
CoIWeak can be accommodated more easily. The above points can
certainly also be a factor within this weaker conception of a conflict of
interest: Because individuals are dispositioned to form pleasant beliefs in
some circumstances, they deviate from an adaptive behavioural norm too
frequently. Furthermore, it is often simply difficult to form true beliefs.
Although there is no intention or desire to not form beliefs in an ideal
manner, if circumstances are complex mistakes are made. I take it to be
intuitive that within cumulative cultural evolution and in recent history
of mankind, there is ample room for many mistakes in the formation of
beliefs to be made. If this happens too often and has ramifications for
the group the individual is part of, then normative conformity is needed.
This second point I think is strengthened by my claim that if there is a
higher degree of interdependence, a lower degree of conflict of interest is
sufficient for normative conformity to be evolutionary sensible. It seems
plausible that past and present groups of people do contain a higher
degree of interdependence than these hunter-gatherer societies did.8 In
this sense, merely getting things wrong often enough is sufficient for
normative conformity.
The above remarks make it clear why normative conformity could be
of use for a social group: Since in the epistemic case normative confor-
mity leads to individuals having true beliefs more reliably, this will lead
to individuals being able to depend on the beliefs of others. However, in
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normative conformity individuals (and not social groups as a whole) are
motivated to conform because of a concern for social information and
interaction. How can this be understood in relation to the above points?
VanSchaik and Burkart argue that because hunter-gatherer societies
were so interdependent, cooperative behaviour was of central importance
to many of their endeavours. Cooperation, in turn, is in part regulated
by reputation – only individuals with an adequate reputation will be
seen as viable partners for cooperation. This is also where predictability
becomes relevant: Predictable individuals are more likely to enjoy a good
reputation and thus have ample cooperation-opportunities. The idea
seems to be that individuals are motivated to conform to norms because
of their interest in having a good reputation and thus being able to
cooperate with others. These are clearly concerns for social information
and interactions.
If it is true that within the evolutionary context described above there
is both considerable interdependence and substantial relevance with re-
gards to how beliefs are formed, then it seems quite plausible that part
of an individual’s reputation is of epistemic nature. This means that
the reputation an individual has is in part influenced by how reliable its
beliefs are formed. Again, individuals who are thought of as not having
accurate beliefs to an adequate degree will not be viable partners for
cooperation. I argue that it is in part individuals’ interest in maintain-
ing a good epistemic reputation and thus gain cooperation-opportunities
(and other benefits which come from being part of a social group) which
motivates them to conform to the doxastic strategies. These concerns for
reputation and cooperation are clearly in relation to social information
and interaction. It also seems quite clear that in these circumstances
individuals do not just conform because of their interest in gaining ac-
curate information: Put simply, even individuals who do not care about
the immediate pay-offs they receive from following the doxastic strate-
gies – i.e. more accurate information about the world – most likely still
care about the social pay-offs they receive from following them – i.e.
cooperation-opportunities and being part of a social group. Put dif-
ferently, individuals do not just conform to doxastic strategies because
otherwise, they would not acquire true beliefs, they also conform because
otherwise their reputation as someone who believes truly would suffer.
Summarising, I find it plausible that individuals first conformed to
doxastic strategies for purely informational reasons. Importantly, they
did not take doxastic strategies to contain categorical normative ele-
ments. However, over the course of time and in such a culturally satu-
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rated social group as envisaged above, where there is ample opportunity
for errors in the formation of beliefs, vast interdependence with regards
to beliefs’ accuracy and where individuals conform to doxastic strategies
because of a concern for their reputation that the normative pull dispo-
sition came about. This was so because the beliefs produced by means
of informational conformity were too inaccurate. This could have been
because of various factors: Individuals could have competing interests to
form pleasant, rather than true beliefs, employing these strategies to in
complex settings could have been difficult or individuals could just have
been disposed to favour other ways of forming beliefs. Either way, too
many grave errors in belief-formation were committed for which both
individuals and their respective social groups paid the price. Thus, at a
certain point – or within a gradual change – normative conformity and
with it the normative pull disposition could establish themselves, because
PF1 was fulfilled even more reliably by mistaking doxastic strategies to
be categorical doxastic norms, by punishing others as though they vio-
lated such norms and by expecting and feeling that oneself and others
ought to conform to these supposed norms.
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Notes
1 It is important to note that these conformity-mechanisms could also be under-
stood within a different kind of account. Sullivan-Bissett herself claims that an
expressivist-account of epistemic normativity could also be given. Such an ac-
count would minimally claim that our epistemic discourse does not give voice to
explicit beliefs of subjects, but rather a non-cognitive mental state. It seems at
least intuitively plausible, that conformity mechanisms could play a role within
such an account. Developing Sullivan-Bissett’s account should nonetheless be a
worthwhile endeavour.
2 It seems worth mentioning that Sullivan-Bissett actually argues for an account
of biological functions which is slightly different, but still inspired from the more
traditional accounts given by Millikan and Neander [see 23]. The differences
between these accounts are however not relevant for this paper.
22 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, AO, AO(AO): 1–26
3 Sullivan-Bissett also notes that accounts of the evolutionary advantages of self-
deception have been given by Trivers ([25], [26], [27]) and Van Leeuwen ([31],
[32]).
4 It seems plausible to say that for other cases where PF2 is said to be involved –
for example, self-deception – the adaptive value would be spelled out differently.
5 Direct reciprocity takes place when one individual helps another individual in
exchange for a future return. Indirect reciprocity takes place when the favour is
returned by a 3rd-party individual [11].
6 I will follow Mesoudi & Jensen [11] and Henrich & McElreath [8] in their expo-
sition of the topic.
7 With regards to the ethics of belief debate, I do not take this to necessitate
ascribing any unusual amount of control over the ways we form beliefs to subjects.
8 Kappeler et al [9] make a related point comparing the complexity of present




Basil Müller: Normativity as a Kind of Conformity 23
References
[1] Burkart, Judith; Bruegger, Rahel & van Schaik, Carel. “Evolution-
ary Origins of Morality: Insights from Nonhuman Primates”. In:
Frontiers in Sociology 3 (2018), p. 17.
[2] Claidière, Nicolas & Whiten, Andrew. “Integrating the study of
conformity and culture in humans and nonhuman animals”. In:
Psychological Bulletin 138.1 (2012), p. 126.
[3] Deutsch, Morton & Gerard, Harold. “A study of normative and
informational social influences upon individual judgment”. In: The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51.3 (1955), p. 629.
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